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Major food companies, PES and combating deforestation 
Using PES to achieve 
“zero deforestation” 
agriculture
Alain KARSENTY
Strategies to tackle deforestation are evolving. Under pressure from environmental 
NGOs and consumers, the major food companies are voluntarily committing to apply 
the “zero deforestation” principle, especially for their production of the key 
agricultural commodities (palm oil, cocoa, soy, etc.), which are responsible for around 
70% of deforestation throughout the world. This concept is nevertheless ambiguous 
and difficult to implement.
Payments for environmental services (PES) can help to achieve these ambitions. PES 
geared towards individual investment would be proposed to producers to enable 
them to modify their practices; these would be financed by zero deforestation 
companies. In addition, collective PES for forest conservation at the local level would 
be proposed to communities; these would be partly financed by a broad-based, 
low-level fee. 
> 
Through Perspective, 
CIRAD provides  
the opportunity  
to explore new avenues 
for discussion and 
action based on 
research, without 
presenting an 
institutional position.
persp ctivee
Forests - Climate changeNovember 2015 . n° 36
Deforestation is an important element of global environmental agendas: climate, biodiversity, and combating desertifica-
tion. With gross forest cover loss in tropical 
countries reaching almost 10 million hectares per 
year (Global Forest Watch, 2015), deforestation 
rates remain very high. Although land-use change 
now accounts for only around 10% of annual 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, this is 
because fossil fuel emissions continue to grow, 
whereas the global deforestation rate has changed 
little over the past decade at the global level. 
More than 80% of deforested land is used for 
agricultural purposes. Industrial agriculture is 
responsible for two thirds of deforestation in 
Latin America and for one third in Africa. In 
addition to their direct responsibility, firms are 
also involved in deforestation caused by small 
producers. They are supporting the diversification 
of production systems towards perennial crops 
(oil palms, cocoa) through contracts with or 
monitoring of producers via the cooperatives that 
supply them.
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Voluntary commitments 
by firms... 
For several years and especially since 2010, the 
major transnational food companies, especially 
for palm oil, which are criticised by environmen-
tal organisations, have been encouraged to cut 
out of their supply chains any products derived 
from deforestation. They played a key role in the 
New York Declaration on Forests during the UN 
Climate Summit 2014. Groups of companies – 
the Consumer Goods Forum (soy) and the 
Tropical Forest Alliance (palm oil) – took part 
in its organisation. Several companies, alongside 
heads of state and government, pledged to halve 
the loss of the world’s natural forests by 2020 and 
to halt deforestation by 2030. Moreover, some 
20 companies committed to sourcing deforesta-
tion-free palm oil, such as the Indonesian 
Wilmar, one of the leading global producers. 
Finally, some states – Indonesia, Côte d’Ivoire 
– pledged to support companies’ efforts to elimi-
nate from their supply chains agricultural pro-
ducts derived from deforestation.
Companies’ zero deforestation commitments are 
becoming a new tool for mobilisation, whereas 
the hopes raised by REDD+ (Reducing Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion in developing countries) are now fading.
... that are difficult 
to implement 
However, these voluntary commitments are dif-
ficult to implement and to verify, especially when 
supply chains are comprised of a large number 
of small producers.
First of all, the concept of zero deforestation 
remains ambiguous. It implies agreement on the 
definition of a forest, especially on the minimum 
forest cover threshold per unit area and on 
canopy height. Deforestation itself has several 
definitions. For FAO, a logged area is not 
counted as deforestation unless it has been 
converted to another land use, while for Global 
Forest Watch, this would be considered to be 
deforestation. A distinction also needs to be 
made between gross and net zero deforestation: 
net calculations allow for offsetting deforestation 
in one area with reforestation in another, even if 
the nature of the forests cleared and those 
planted is different, especially in terms of biodi-
versity. The companies that have adopted zero 
deforestation remain vague about these aspects.
Next, how can consumers be sure the products 
they buy are zero deforestation if these products 
cannot be accurately traced from the original plot 
because there is no reliable cadastre? The clarifi-
cation of land rights and the implementation of 
a georeferenced land information system in rural 
areas are therefore prerequisites.
Moreover, the zero deforestation targets imposed 
by companies are often too restrictive for small 
producers. This is reflected in the steps taken by 
producer organisations in Indonesia and Malay-
sia: they have asked palm oil companies to aban-
don their commitments and to adopt less binding 
objectives, on the grounds that small producers 
are unable to meet these requirements. Without 
additional long-term support for small producers 
to enable them to meet the demands of these 
firms, the zero deforestation commitment will 
be compromised.
Finally, it would be a mistake to think that even 
if firms are in a position to guarantee the effec-
tiveness of their commitments, they can succeed 
in reversing current deforestation and degrada-
tion dynamics. Indeed, any given territory faces 
numerous factors of deforestation and, more 
generally, of environmental degradation, and 
managing one factor may lead to the develop-
ment of another. Controlling production condi-
tions for farmers in one sector does not mean 
that all drivers of degradation are controlled – 
other agricultural or pastoral production systems, 
charcoal production, and timber harvesting. In 
other words, a zero deforestation approach in one 
or more organised sectors could be accompanied 
by continued environmental degradation in a 
given territory. It is therefore necessary to act not 
only in supply chains, with firms and producers, 
but also in territories, with the communities 
living there.
PES as public policy tools 
How can these obstacles be overcome? Payments 
for environmental services (PES) can provide an 
instrument for decoupling agricultural develop-
ment and deforestation, in the sense that they 
provide a direct incentive to change practices or 
to engage in conservation.
PES are written contracts, whether individual or 
collective, that are voluntary and conditional 
(payments are provided as long as commitments 
detailed in the contracts are sustained). Most 
PES reward people for a certain type of land use, 
in other words an environmental service provi-
ded by users, a use or service associated with the 
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quantity and quality of an ecological service 
provided by nature. The distinction between land 
use-restricting PES and asset-building PES is 
well established. Individual PES reward people 
for a certain type of land use, in other words an 
environmental service provided. Collective PES 
reward communities for preserving the ecosys-
tems in their territory in the long term.
Combining these two types of PES would make 
it possible to overcome the obstacles described: 
asset-building PES would support small produ-
cers in the adoption of agro-ecological practices; 
and collective PES would finance communities 
to preserve ecosystems in their territory.
As mentioned above, firms will only be able to 
fulfil their commitments if small producers 
implement ecologically intensive agrosilvopas-
toral systems, which will also enable them to 
increase their income and to avoid encroaching 
on the natural ecosystems still available. This 
would require financial support to promote 
innovation and to encourage land users to plant 
trees and hedges or to restore degraded areas. 
Payments could be based on the labour costs 
invested (agricultural minimum wage, for 
example), although variable payments according 
to the species planted or the areas in which these 
operations are conducted could be possible.
These asset-building PES will guide develop-
ments in agrosilvopastoral practices and will 
help to increase the resilience of agricultural 
systems in a context of changing climate and 
environmental conditions by contributing to the 
diversification of crops and activities and sup-
porting the reintroduction of trees into mono-
cultures (for example, establishing agroforestry 
systems in order to also produce shade cocoa).
In addition, collective PES will be implemented 
at the local level to restrict certain land use 
rights: in exchange for regular payments, users 
will suspend some of their rights, whether real 
or deemed legitimate locally. A collective dyna-
mic will thus be created supporting commit-
ments for a given use of the territory, for the 
construction of a sustainable territory or for zero 
deforestation, depending on the case. In order 
to plan or locate new perennial plantations, 
participatory zoning of territories could be deve-
loped. This could be based on two indicators: 
High Conservation Value (HCV), which dis-
tinguishes between forests according to criteria 
such as biodiversity or their socio-cultural role; 
and High Carbon Stock (HCS), which differen-
tiates between forests which even when distur-
bed still provide ecosystem services, and highly 
degraded forests, which can be converted to 
agricultural plantations.
Indicators of the environmental quality of the 
territory will also be discussed with populations. 
PES could help to finance environmental quality 
improvements that depend on collective action 
– for example delimiting village lands by means 
of collective tree planting – and to provide col-
lective advantages (land security through the 
demarcation or registration of individual plots, 
drinking water supply, storage facilities, rural 
roads, schools, dispensaries, etc.) by making them 
conditional on the maintenance or improvement 
of environmental quality, which is measured and 
acknowledged together with the community.
Combining individual asset-building PES and 
collective land use-restricting PES would create 
compulsory solidarity (that would also be neces-
sary to achieve efficiency) to guarantee conser-
vation. Establishing the conditional, tied nature 
of payments (if the collective conservation 
contract is terminated, individual contracts will 
suffer the same fate) would help to limit the risks 
of free riding through the exertion of social 
pressure.
Implementing a system of this kind requires 
substantial public involvement, for example to 
identify and map the individual plots on which 
farmers will fulfil their contractual obligations. 
The approach adopted could be that of the rural 
land use plans (georeferenced cadastral informa-
tion, with the identification of plots and right 
holders, and an indication of the exact nature of 
individual and collective rights). 
Financing through innovation 
How can a mechanism of this kind be financed?
For their zero deforestation commitments to 
become effective, companies must support the 
family farmers under contract to enable them to 
comply with the specifications established, which 
requires contributions to financing their training 
and basic investments (nurseries, etc.).
However, substantial public investment is also 
required. Although international finance in the 
name of climate mitigation or development 
assistance can be mobilised, a national financing 
base would shield this programme from the 
vagaries of international funding.
To ensure sufficient, long-term financial 
resources, it is possible to use a fee mechanism 
with a very broad base and low rate, with fees 
earmarked for the PES programme. This would 
not be environmental taxation (the principle of 
> Combing 
asset-building PES 
and direct incentives 
for conservation
> Associer 
les financements 
internationaux 
publics et privés 
avec un socle 
de financement 
national.
its introduction does not distort competition 
between companies in the different markets.
A system of this kind could soon be imple-
mented in Côte d’Ivoire. This country is basing 
its REDD+ strategy on decoupling agricultural 
development and deforestation. The first stage 
will involve setting up pilot PES systems in 
certain companies’ supply areas, in order to form 
partnerships with the private sector and to test 
different aspects of PES mechanisms. These pilot 
projects will serve to analyse different compo-
nents and methods, and lessons will be drawn 
from them before proposing a national pro-
gramme. This change of scale requires the emer-
gence of a reference national operator with staff 
trained in the pilot mechanisms. Companies will 
need to confirm their zero deforestation com-
mitments and to contribute to financing asset-
building PES. The government will also need to 
fulfil its environmental commitments by intro-
ducing fees allotted to the national PES pro-
gramme. This would increase the credibility of 
policies aimed at promoting a green economy, 
credibility which should be the basis of substan-
tial financial support backed by development 
partners and specialised institutions such as the 
Green Climate Fund. <
which is to tax pollution in order to reduce it), 
but a yield-oriented tax whose proceeds are 
allocated to financing a public good: environ-
mental quality improvement in rural territories 
(through the reintroduction of trees into crop-
ping systems). A broad base means that fees must 
be applied to as many supports as possible, pro-
vided this is socially and therefore politically 
feasible. This is the condition on which the fee 
levels can be low enough to be relatively insen-
sitive for consumers. Indeed, contrary to an eco-
tax, the goal of this type of fee is not to reduce 
consumption of its support (or to increase it), as 
this would reduce its yield and jeopardise the 
financing of the PES programme. Several sup-
ports are possible: telephone units (a slight 
increase in the cost of call seconds); bottled 
drinks (beer, other alcohol, soda, mineral water, 
etc.); sporting bets, lotteries (levies on bets and 
tickets); car tax (increase allotted to the PES 
programme); water distributed by public 
networks (likewise); and fuel distributed in ser-
vice stations (likewise). Companies and distri-
butors would simply collect fees, which would 
be set by the government and applied in a gene-
ral, uniform manner. The burden of the fee would 
fall on final consumers, as with VAT, to ensure 
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This Perspective is the result of research conducted 
as part of the PESMIX project, financed by the 
French National Research Agency (http://pesmix.
cirad.fr/), and a study conducted by CIRAD in Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2015, financed by UN-REDD and the 
EU REDD+ Facility (EFI - European Forest Ins-
titute).
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